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Abstract	::	The	idea	of	“material	plenitude”	has	been	gaining	traction	in	recent	discussions	
of	the	metaphysics	of	material	objects.	My	main	goal	here	is	to	show	that	this	idea	may	have	
important	dialectical	implications	for	the	metaphysics	of	properties	–	more	specifically,	that	
it	provides	nominalists	with	new	resources	in	their	attempt	to	reject	an	ontology	of	
universals.	I	will	recapitulate	one	of	the	main	arguments	against	nominalism	–	due	to	David	
Armstrong	–	and	show	how	plenitude	helps	the	nominalist	overcome	the	argument.	
	
	
Introduction	
	
The	term	“nominalism”	is	used	for	a	variety	of	different	positions	in	different	areas	of	
philosophy.	Here	I	will	use	it	as	a	name	for	the	following	thesis:	Everything	there	is	either	
(a)	is	a	concrete	particular	or	(b)	is	built	out	of	concrete	particulars.	What	exactly	is	a	
“concrete	particular”	and	what	is	a	“building	relation”	are	complicated	issues	that	I	wish	to	
bracket	here.	Informally,	a	concrete	particular	is	an	entity	which	“takes	up”	some	space	and	
can	be	wholly	present	in	only	one	place	at	a	time;	paradigmatic	instances	include	boats,	
flowers,	and	parrots.	And	building	relations	are	relations	that	generate	a	single	entity	out	of	
a	plurality	of	entities	in	a	way	that	does	not	bring	something	“categorically	new”	into	the	
world;	here	the	paradigm	is	probably	mereological	composition.			
	 Given	the	premium	ontologists	put	on	parsimony,	nominalism	is	highly	attractive.	
Indeed,	as	far	as	so-called	qualitative	parsimony	is	concerned	–	parsimony	concerning	types	
or	categories	of	entity	–	nominalism	is	maximally	parsimonious,	since	it	admits	entities	of	
only	one	ontological	category.	Nominalism	is	of	course	not	the	only	one-category	ontology	–	
think	of	Armstrong’s	“world	of	states	of	affairs,”	or	Whitehead’s	“process	ontology.”	But	
nominalism	is	also	distinguished	by	the	overwhelming	familiarity	of	the	entities	it	
privileges.	Speaking	for	myself,	I	run	into	concrete	particulars	all	day	long	and	have	actually	
held	concrete	particulars	in	my	own	two	hands.	In	contrast,	I	have	never	held	a	process	or	a	
state	of	affairs.		
	 If	nominalism	is	so	attractive,	why	is	it	a	minority	position	in	contemporary	
ontology?	There	are	in	fact	several	sources	of	resistance	to	nominalism.	I	cannot	address	all	
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of	them	here.	Instead,	I	focus	on	one	argument,	due	to	David	Armstrong,	which	seems	to	me	
(and	others,	though	not	everybody)	to	capture	at	least	one	important	source	of	resistance.	
The	basic	idea	may	be	put	as	follows.		
The	schema	“x	is	F”	has	many	true	instances.	“The	Statue	of	Liberty	is	verdigris”	and	
“The	statue	of	Liberty	has	mass	m”	are	just	two	examples	(where	verdigris	is	that	peculiar	
light	grayish-green	color	copper	becomes	as	it	rusts	and	m	is	whatever	maximally	
determinate	mass	property	the	Statue	in	fact	has).	What	grounds,	or	metaphysically	
explains,	the	truth	of	such	statements?	That	is,	what	are	their	truthmakers?	A	traditional	
answer	appeals	centrally	to	universals	–	entities	that	can	be	wholly	present	in	different	
places	at	the	same	time.	The	truthmaker	of	“The	Statue	of	Liberty	has	mass	m,”	on	this	view,	
is	the	fact	that	a	certain	concrete	particular,	the	Statue	of	Liberty	(which	is	wholly	present	
in	only	one	place	at	a	time),	instantiates	a	certain	universal,	having	mass	m	(which	is	wholly	
present	wherever	something	has	mass	m).	This	is	a	very	natural	view,	but	not	one	that	the	
nominalist	is	entitled	to,	since	it	invokes	universals.	The	nominalist	must	identify	a	
truthmaker	for	“The	Statue	of	Liberty	has	mass	m”	that	invokes	concrete	particulars	
exclusively.	But	–	so	goes	Armstrong’s	argument	–	there	is	no	remotely	plausible	way	to	do	
this.		
In	section	1,	I	lay	out	the	argument	with	more	precision.	In	section	2,	I	illustrate	the	
depth	of	the	challenge	by	applying	it	to	David	Lewis’s	“class	nominalism.”	After	a	detour	in	
sections	3–4	through	recent	discussions	of	“material	plenitude,”	I	formulate	in	section	5	a	
version	of	nominalism	that	incorporates	plenitude.	In	section	6,	I	show	how	this	version	–	I	
call	it	plenitudinous	nominalism	–	provides	nominalistic	truthmakers	for	simple	predicative	
truths	like	“The	Statue	of	Liberty	has	mass	m.”	There	follows	a	brief	interlude	(section	7)	on	
David	Lewis’s	final	view	as	it	comes	through	in	a	posthumously	published	article.	I	close,	in	
section	8,	by	addressing	wider	potential	concerns	with	plenitudinous	nominalism.	
Naturally,	even	if	we	accept	that	a	certain	version	of	nominalism	can	solve	one	
problem	for	nominalism,	that	would	not	show	that	it	can	solve	all	problems	for	nominalism.	
It	would	show,	however,	that	the	existence	of	true	predicative	statements	does	not	by	itself	
rule	out	nominalism.	To	that	extent,	it	would	constitute	important	input	into	the	dialectic.	In	
future	work,	I	intend	to	develop	the	fuller	case	for	plenitudinous	nominalism.		
	
1.		Armstrong’s	Truthmaker	Argument	against	Nominalism		
	
It	is	far	from	obvious	just	what	a	truthmaker	is.	Armstrong	himself	held	that	the	truthmaker	
of	p	is	an	entity	E,	such	that	E’s	existence	necessitates	the	truth	of	p	(2004:	5).	Some	
philosophers	have	argued	that	this	is	too	strong,	entailing,	at	least	against	certain	
assumptions,	that	all	truths	are	necessary	(Williamson	1999).	But	it	is	also	possible	to	see	
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necessitation	as	too	weak:	we	expect	a	truthmaker	to	make	us	see	why	a	statement	is	true,	
and	necessitation	is	not	always	explanatory	in	this	way.1	Thus	some	philosophers	have	
understood	truthmaking	in	terms	of	metaphysical	(or	“grounding”)	explanation:	E	is	the	
truthmaker	of	p	iff	the	existence	of	E	metaphysically	explains	the	truth	of	p,	in	the	sense	that	
p	is	true	in	virtue	of	E	existing	(Rodriguez-Pereyra	2002:	30,	34).	
	 Indulging	Armstrong,	but	not	wishing	to	beg	any	questions	against	others,	I	will	here	
require	truthmakers	to	be	both	necessitating	and	explanatory.	This	would	ensure	that	we	
have	not	weakened,	but	on	the	contrary	have	only	strengthened,	Armstrong’s	hand.	If	we	
can	show	that	even	in	this	strengthened	form	the	truthmaker	argument	fails,	we	will	have	
done	nominalism	a	good	service.		
The	result	is	the	following	argument	against	nominalism.	Let	us	contract	“The	Statue	
of	Liberty”	into	“SoL”	and	“has	mass	m”	into	“is	M.”	Then:	
1) An	adequate	ontological	theory	must	posit	an	entity	(or	entities)	the	existence	of	
which	both	necessitates	and	explains	the	truth	of	“SoL	is	M”;	
2) If	nominalism	were	right	that	there	are	only	concrete	particulars,	there	would	be	no	
entity	(nor	entities)	the	existence	of	which	both	necessitates	and	explains	the	truth	
of	“SoL	is	M”;	therefore,	
3) Nominalism	is	not	an	adequate	ontological	theory.		
Obviously,	there	are	two	ways	to	resist	this	argument.	The	“metaontological	route”	rejects	
Armstrong’s	truthmaker	requirement	(i.e.,	premise	1).	The	ontological	route	accepts	the	
truthmaker	requirement	but	insists	that	nominalism	can	meet	it	(contra	premise	2).		
The	natural	way	to	develop	the	metaontological	objection	is	through	the	thought	that	
while	there	may	sometimes	be	no	entity	E	the	very	existence	of	which	metaphysically	
explains	the	truth	of	“x	is	F,”	there	is	always	an	entity	the	character	of	which	does.	
Accordingly,	the	only	entity	required	to	explain	the	truth	of	“SoL	is	M”	is	SoL,	though	it	is	
not	just	the	existence	of	SoL	that	is	implicated	in	the	explanation	–	it	is	also	the	character	of	
SoL,	what	SoL	is	like.	This	response,	which	Armstrong	(1978:	16)	facetiously	called	“ostrich	
nominalism,”	essentially	rejects	Armstrong’s	“rules	of	the	game”	(for	the	latest	iteration	of	
ostrich	nominalism,	see	Hofweber	2016:	288).	
	 As	before,	I	will	indulge	Armstrong	here	and	grant	him	his	“rules	of	the	game.”	This	is	
not	because	I	want	to	endorse	Armstrong’s	truthmaker	methodology,	but	on	the	contrary	
because	I	am	(here)	disinterested	in	metaontological	questions.	I	am	much	more	interested	
in	a	distinctive	first-order	ontology	that	emerges	as	an	elegant	response	to	Armstrong’s	
truthmaker	argument,	I	want	to	argue,	when	nominalism	incorporates	a	certain,	somewhat	
untraditional	approach	to	material	objects.	Accordingly,	I	will	pursue	the	“ontological	
route”	of	rejecting	premise	2	above.	
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	 The	difficulty	in	pursuing	this	approach	is	easy	to	appreciate.	On	its	own,	the	sheer	
existence	of	SoL	neither	necessitates	nor	explains	the	truth	of	“SoL	is	M.”	It	clearly	does	not	
necessitate	the	truth:	loss	of	a	small	enough	part	would	not	destroy	SoL,	but	would	change	
its	mass.	SoL	would	then	still	exist,	but	“SoL	is	M”	would	no	longer	be	true.	In	addition,	the	
mere	existence	of	SoL	does	not	fully	explain	the	truth	of	“SoL	is	M.”	What	the	sheer	existence	
of	SoL	fully	explains	is	the	truth	of	“SoL	exists.”	But	in	“SoL	is	M”	there	is	some	extra	
information,	not	included	in	“SoL	exists,”	and	there	is	nothing	in	the	mere	existence	of	SoL	
to	explain	the	truth	of	a	statement	that	includes	this	extra	information.2		
Another	aspect	of	this	explanatory	failure	is	this:	the	truths	of	“SoL	is	M,”	“SoL	is	
verdigris,”	and	“SoL	exists”	are	distinct	explananda,	and	there	is	no	reason	to	expect	them	to	
receive	the	same	explanans.	So	SoL	should	not	be	the	thing	whose	existence	explains	all	of	
them.	Sometimes	there	are	reasons	to	expect	a	single	explanans.	“Phosphorus	is	spherical,”	
“Hesperus	is	spherical,”	and	“Hesperus	is	spherical	or	cubic”	all	receive	the	same	
truthmaker	–	for	Armstrong,	it	is	the	state	of	affairs	consisting	of	Venus	being	spherical	–	
but	here	there	are	reasons	we	can	cite	for	this:	the	fact	that	“Phosphorus”	and	“Hesperus”	
co-refer	and	the	fact	that	that	referent	is	spherical-or-cubic	in	virtue	of	being	spherical.	But	
there	is	nothing	like	this	in	the	case	of	“SoL	is	M,”	“SoL	is	verdigris,”	and	“SoL	exists.”	We	
should	thus	expect	a	distinct	explanans	for	each	of	these;	it	should	not	be	the	same	thing	
that	explains	the	truth	of	all	of	them	–	and	of	every	other	SoL-truth	to	boot.	
The	extant	literature	features	a	number	of	nominalist	attempts	to	address	the	
problem	of	identifying	universals-free	truthmakers	for	such	simple	predicative	truths	–	we	
may	call	it,	following	Van	Cleve	(1994),	the	problem	of	“predication	without	universals.”	
Although	my	purpose	in	this	paper	is	positive	rather	than	destructive,	I	want	to	illustrate	
the	severity	of	the	problem	by	considering	the	difficulties	it	presented	to	David	Lewis’s	
class	nominalism.	
	
2.		Lewis’s	Nominalism	and	Its	Discontents		
	
Perhaps	the	most	straightforward	version	of	nominalism	is	“class	nominalism,”	which	in	
addition	to	straightforwardness	can	claim	for	itself	the	virtue	of	having	been	David	Lewis’s	
view	(1983,	1986).	On	this	view,	the	truthmaker	of	a	true	statement	of	the	form	“x	is	F”	is	
always	x’s	a	membership	in	the	class	of	all	and	only	Fs.	Thus,	what	necessitates	and	explains	
the	truth	of	“SoL	is	M”	is	SoL’s	membership	in	a	class	of	concrete	particulars,	the	class	we	
would	informally	describe	as	the	m-massed	objects.		
An	immediate	problem	for	class	nominalism	is	that	the	membership	relation	invoked	
here	threatens	to	reintroduce	a	universal.	The	same	relation	SoL	bears	to	the	set	of	m-
massed	objects	it	also	bears	to	the	set	of	statues,	the	set	of	verdigris	objects,	and	so	on;	and	
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it	is	the	same	relation	that	the	horsehead	in	Hyde	Park	bears	to	the	set	of	verdigris	objects.	
It	is,	in	all	these	cases,	the	membership	relation,	which	thus	seems	to	be	a	repeatable	entity.	
The	suspicion	is	that	“SoL	is	a	member	of	S”	(where	S	is	the	class	of	all	m-massed	objects)	
will	have	to	be	made	true	by	the	fact	that	the	membership	universal	is	instantiated	jointly	
by	SoL	and	S.	Might	it	be	made	true	instead	by	the	fact	that	the	ordered	pair	(SoL,	S)	is	a	
member	of	the	set	of	all	membership	pairs?	It	certainly	might,	but	as	Russell	(1912:	55)	
pointed	out	in	a	similar	context,	this	leads	immediately	to	an	infinite	regress.	
	 Even	if	the	class	nominalist	manages	to	render	the	appeal	to	membership	harmless	
(perhaps	in	the	manner	of	Rodriguez-Pereyra	2001),	one	might	wonder	what	relevance	an	
object’s	membership	in	a	class	with	other	objects	has	to	the	object’s	mass.	David	Armstrong	
presses	the	point	forcefully	(1992:	16):		
[C]onsider	the	natural	class	consisting	of	all	and	only	the	objects	having	temperature	T.	Let	a	be	a	
member	of	this	class.	What	have	the	other	members	of	this	class	.	.	.	to	do	with	a’s	temperature?	After	
all	there	would	appear	to	be	a	possible	world	where	these	other	members	do	not	exist,	or	where	they	
exist	but	lack	temperature	T.		
Recall	that	a	truthmaker	is	supposed	to	explain	a	statement’s	truth.	But	given	that	an	
object’s	mass	is	an	intrinsic	affair,	other	m-massed	objects	would	appear	to	be	explanatorily	
irrelevant	to	the	truth	of	“SoL	has	mass	m.”	
Indeed,	suppose	that	due	to	a	cosmic	incident,	all	objects	suddenly	and	
instantaneously	doubled	in	mass.	Then	SoL	would	still	be	a	member	of	the	same	class	of	
objects	as	before,	but	“SoL	has	mass	m”	would	no	longer	be	true	–	it	is	rather	“SoL	has	mass	
2m”	that	would.		
Another	issue	is	that	the	class-nominalist	approach	to	predication	is	really	hopeless	
unless	class	nominalists	welcome	concrete	possibilia	into	their	ontology	–	which	Lewis	of	
course	did,	but	which	not	every	nominalist	might	be	keen	to.	We	can	see	this	by	considering	
a	pair	of	objections	that	would	be	quite	decisive	if	appeal	to	concrete	possibilia	were	not	
contemplated.		
First,	consider	predicative	truths	involving	coextensive	predicates.	All	and	only	
renates	are	cordates,	but	intuitively,	what	explains	the	truth	of	“Socrates	is	renate”	is	
different	from	what	explains	the	truth	of	“Socrates	is	cordate.”	On	the	face	of	it,	though,	
class	nominalism	identifies	the	same	truthmaker:	the	fact	that	Socrates	is	a	member	of	class	
C,	the	class	of	all	and	only	renates/cordates.	As	before,	the	explananda	are	different	–	why	
should	the	explanans	be	the	same?	For	someone	like	Armstrong,	the	explanantia	are	indeed	
different:	the	state	of	affairs	of	Socrates	instantiating	the	universal	of	being	renate	in	one	
case,	the	state	of	affairs	of	Socrates	instantiating	the	universal	of	being	cordate	in	the	other	
case.	These	are	different	states	of	affairs,	since	they	have	a	different	constituent	in	the	
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universal	position.	The	question	is	whether	the	nominalist	could	also	produce	different	
explanantia	here.		
Secondly,	consider	predicative	truths	involving	single-instance	predicates.	The	
cosmos	as	a	whole,	understood	as	the	totality	of	matter,	has	some	specific	mass	too.	Let	us	
suppose	it	is	10100	kg.	(The	total	mass	of	the	what	physicists	call	the	“observable	universe”	
is	apparently	something	in	the	vicinity	of	1.5	x1053	kg.	We	do	not	know	whether	the	
unobservable	universe	is	finite	or	infinite,	but	for	simplicity	let	us	suppose	that	it	is	finite	
and	its	mass	is	exactly	10100	kg.)	Then	the	predicate	“has	a	mass	of	10100	kg”	applies	to	only	
one	object	–	the	cosmos.	What	makes	“The	cosmos	has	a	mass	of	10100	kg”	true?	According	
to	class	nominalism,	it	would	be	the	cosmos’s	membership	in	the	singleton	{the	cosmos}.	
But	this	membership	fact	seems	hopelessly	inadequate	to	the	task,	as	it	neither	necessitates	
nor	explains	the	truth	of	“The	cosmos	has	a	mass	of	10100	kg.”	After	all,	if	the	cosmos	
somehow	lost	some	of	its	mass	(or	doubled	it,	or	whatever),	it	would	still	be	a	member	of	
{the	cosmos}	–	but	“The	cosmos	has	a	mass	of	10100	kg”	would	be	false.	And	how	is	the	
cosmos’s	membership	in	{the	cosmos}	supposed	to	in	any	way	illuminate	or	explain	the	
truth	of	“The	cosmos	has	a	mass	of	10100	kg,”	as	opposed	to	the	putative	truth	of	“The	
cosmos	has	a	mass	of	2	kg”	or	indeed	of	“The	cosmos	is	nice”?	
These	problems	disappear	when	we	construe	the	relevant	classes	as	including	not	
only	actual	but	also	merely	possible	objects	(Lewis	1986:	50).	Although	the	class	of	all	actual	
renates	is	the	same	as	the	class	of	all	actual	cordates,	the	class	of	all	possible	renates	is	
distinct	from	the	class	of	all	possible	cordates.	Although	the	set	of	all	actual	10100	kg	massed	
objects	is	just	{the	cosmos},	the	set	of	all	possible	10100	kg	massed	objects	is	much	vaster.	
Thus	the	problems	presented	by	coextensive	and	single-instance	predications	can	be	solved	
if	one	counts	also	merely	possible	objects.	Recall,	however,	that	for	nominalists	everything	
either	is	or	is	built	out	of	concrete	particulars.	So	for	this	option	to	be	available	to	
nominalists,	they	must	construe	merely	possible	objects	as	concrete	particulars	(or	else	as	
somehow	built	out	of	concrete	particulars	–	unclear	how	that	might	work).	Thus	must	class	
nominalists	hitch	their	wagon	to	the	star	of	concretist	modal	realism.	This	is	not	the	place	to	
debate	the	merits	of	concretist	modal	realism,	but	it	is	no	secret	that	most	contemporary	
metaphysicians	do	not	endorse	it.	It	would	be	disappointing	news	to	learn	that	
nominalism’s	viability	is	hostage	to	the	dialectical	vicissitudes	of	concretist	modal	realism.		
In	addition,	we	should	keep	in	mind	that	embracing	concretist	modal	realism	does	
nothing	to	assuage	the	aforementioned	worries	for	nominalism,	for	instance	concerning	the	
relevance	of	class	membership	to	the	truth	of	intrinsic	predications.	
Obviously,	Lewis-style	class	nominalism	is	not	the	only	nominalist	approach	to	
predication	without	universals.	But	at	least	by	way	of	illustration,	I	hope	the	discussion	in	
this	section	makes	clear	the	severity	of	the	difficulties	nominalism	faces	when	it	tries	to	
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identify	adequate	truthmakers	for	even	the	simplest	predicative	truths.	In	the	remainder	of	
this	paper,	I	want	to	present	a	novel	approach	to	the	problem,	one	that	identifies	certain	
actual	concrete	particulars	which	both	necessitate	and	explain	the	truth	of	predicative	
statements.	To	appreciate	this	approach,	though,	I	need	to	introduce	an	idea	that	has	
commanded	increasing	support	elsewhere	in	contemporary	metaphysics:	the	idea	of	
material	plenitude.		
	
3.		Coincidence		
	
The	Statue	of	Liberty	is	made	of	a	certain	quantity	of	copper.	Is	this	lump	of	copper	the	
same	object	as	SoL,	or	a	different	one?	According	to	one-thingism,	they	are	the	same;	
according	to	two-thingism,	they	are	different.	Most	philosophers	are	two-thingists	here.	The	
basic	reason	is	simply	the	intuition	that	if	we	flattened	the	lump	of	copper,	SoL	would	be	
destroyed	but	the	copper-lump	would	go	on	existing.	This	seems	to	show	that	SoL	and	the	
copper-lump	–	call	it	Cooper	–	have	different	identity	and	persistence	conditions,	and	are	
thus	distinct	beings,	despite	coinciding	perfectly	in	space.		
	 Strictly	speaking,	all	the	fact	that	a	scenario	is	possible	in	which	Cooper	exists	but	
SoL	does	not	shows	is	that,	in	that	possible	scenario,	SoL	≠	Cooper.	The	one-thingist	may	still	
insist	that	even	though	SoL	≠	Cooper	in	that	counterfactual	scenario,	in	the	actual	world	SoL	
=	Cooper.	But	this	requires	that	what	is	one	thing	in	one	possible	world	is	two	things	in	a	
different	possible	world	(Gibbard	1975).	It	is	not	easy	to	wrap	one’s	mind	around	this	
notion	(what	does	“what”	refer	to	in	the	locution	“what	is	one	thing	in	one	world”?),	and	so	
it	is	standard	in	modal	logic	that	if	x	=	y	then	necessarily	x	=	y.	Kripke	(1971)	famously	
offered	a	straightforward	argument	for	this:	clearly,	x	=	x	holds	not	just	contingently,	but	
necessarily,	but	if	x	=	y	and	necessarily	x	=	x,	then	necessarily	x	=	y;	so,	if	x	=	y,	then	
necessarily	x	=	y.	This	is	not	the	place,	of	course,	to	debate	the	ultimate	merits	of	
“contingent	identity.”	What	I	want	to	point	out	is	just	this:	to	infer	two-thingism	from	the	
possibility	of	SoL	going	out	of	existence	without	Cooper	going	out	of	existence,	all	we	have	
to	assume	is	the	principle	of	the	necessity	of	identity.	With	this	principle	at	hand,	we	can	
offer	the	following	little	argument	for	two-thingism:		
1) We	can	imagine	circumstances	where	SoL	goes	out	of	existence	but	Cooper	does	not;	
so,		
2) Possibly,	SoL	≠	Cooper;		
3) For	any	x	and	y,	if	x	=	y	then	necessarily	x	=	y;	therefore,	
4) SoL	≠	Cooper.		
Call	this	the	“little	argument.”	
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	 Suppose	then	that	SoL	≠	Cooper.	How	can	we	account	for	this	non-identity	of	
perfectly	coincident	objects?	What	explains	this	non-identity?	The	task	is	specially	difficult	
given	that	SoL	and	Cooper	are	qualitatively	indistinguishable:	they	have	the	same	shape,	the	
same	color,	the	same	mass,	and	so	on.	They	do	differ	in	some	of	their	modal	and	temporal	
properties,	and	maybe	such	things	as	kind	properties,	but	such	differences	seem	to	flow	
from	their	being	distinct	objects	rather	than	to	underlie	it.	As	a	testament	to	this,	note	that	
one-thingists	in	fact	deny	that	SoL	and	Cooper	differ	in	their	modal	and	temporal	
properties;	the	only	difference,	for	them,	is	in	descriptions	of	the	same	object,	with	whatever	
modal	properties	it	has.	Thus	difference	in	modal	differences	etc.	cannot	be	the	ultimate	
explanation,	for	a	two-thingist,	of	the	non-identity	of	SoL	and	Cooper.	What	might?	
	 We	will	consider	some	options	in	a	moment.	But	first	I	want	to	stress,	for	reasons	I	
will	come	back	to	later,	that	looking	for	what	explains	the	alleged	non-identity	of	SoL	and	
Cooper	is	by	and	large	a	separate	matter	from	identifying	what	motivates	believing	in	such	
non-identity	in	the	first	place.	What	motivates	the	non-identity	is	the	little	argument	above,	
whose	only	independent	premises	are	(1),	the	imaginability	of	scenarios	in	which	Cooper	
exists	but	SoL	does	not,	and	(3),	the	principle	of	the	necessity	of	identity.	If	we	accept	both	
these	premises,	we	are	more	or	less	forced	into	two-thingism.	Once	we	have	accepted	two-
thingism,	we	may	then	raise	the	question	of	what	explains	the	non-identity	of	such	
intimately	bound-up	objects.	It	is	true	that	the	availability	of	an	explanation	would	deepen	
our	confidence	in	two-thingism,	and	that	the	more	satisfying	the	explanation	the	deeper	our	
conviction	will	go.	Nonetheless,	it	is	significant	that	there	are	reasons	to	believe	two-
thingism	which	are	independent	of,	and	prior	to,	any	explanation	of	the	non-identity	of	SoL	
and	Cooper.	The	significance	of	this	will	emerge	in	section	5.		
	 What,	then,	might	explain	the	non-identity	of	SoL	and	Cooper?	One	possibility,	of	
course,	is	that	the	difference	between	them	is	brute	and	inexplicable:	they	are	different	
things,	and	that	is	all	there	is	to	it.	Some	philosophers	have	argued	that	object	
identity/difference	is	always	brute	like	this	(e.g.,	Hazlett	2010:	81).	On	this	view,	nothing	
underlies	the	individuality	of	individuals	–	Socrates	is	one	individual,	Plato	is	another,	and	
any	other	difference	there	might	be	between	them	presupposes	this	fact.	If	this	is	true	of	
Socrates	and	Plato,	it	would	presumably	be	true	also	of	SoL	and	Cooper.		
Naturally,	though,	we	typically	prefer	an	informative	explanation,	where	we	can	have	
it,	over	brute	facts.	A	simple	explanation	of	SoL’s	alleged	non-identity	with	Cooper	might	be	
that	they	have	different	haecceities.	However	else	they	differ,	says	the	haecceitist,	Socrates	
and	Plato	also	differ	in	that	only	one	of	them	has	Socrateity,	while	the	other	has	Platotude.	It	
is	this	fact	that	ultimately	underlies	Socrates	≠	Plato.	By	the	same	token,	the	suggestion	
might	go,	in	addition	to	being	m-massed,	verdigris,	tall,	and	so	on,	SoL	also	has	SoLitude,	
while	Cooper	has	Coopereity	instead.		
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The	explanatory	depth	of	this	proposed	explanation	is	a	tad	disappointing:	we	are	
told	that	what	explains	the	fact	that	SoL	≠	Cooper	is	that	SoL’s	haecceity	≠	Cooper’s	
haecceity	–	but	then	the	“explanation”	comes	to	an	abrupt	end.	A	deeper,	more	informative	
explanation	is	that	although	SoL	and	Cooper	have	all	the	same	qualitative	(non-modal,	non-
temporal,	non-haecceistic,	etc.)	properties,	they	differ	in	whether	they	have	these	
properties	essentially	or	accidentally.	For	example,	SoL	has	essentially	its	statuesque	shape,	
whereas	Cooper	has	that	shape	merely	accidentally.	This	is	why	Cooper	can	survive	the	
kind	of	dramatic	change	in	shape	that	SoL	cannot.		
This	explanation	of	SoL	≠	Cooper	has	its	cost,	insofar	as	it	posits	two	ways	of	having	
properties	(essentially	and	accidentally),	but	perhaps	that	is	just	the	price	of	
informativeness	and	explanatory	depth.	In	any	case,	it	is	this	explanation	that	the	great	
majority	of	two-thingists	have	in	fact	adopted.	Keep	in	mind,	though,	that	although	shared	
by	many	two-thingists,	this	is	just	an	explanation	of	why	SoL	≠	Cooper,	not	what	motivates	
believing	that	SoL	≠	Cooper	in	the	first	place.		
	
4.		Plenitude	
	
Suppose	what	makes	SoL	and	Cooper	distinct	is	that	there	are	properties	F	and	G,	such	that	
both	SoL	and	Cooper	are	F	and	G,	but	SoL	is	essentially	F	while	Cooper	is	accidentally	F	
and/or	Cooper	is	essentially	G	while	SoL	is	accidentally	G.	This	raises	some	questions.	Is	
there	also	a	third	object,	coincident	with	both	SoL	and	Cooper,	which	has	both	F	and	G	
essentially?	Is	there	a	fourth	one	that	has	both	F	and	G	merely	accidentally?	If	not,	why	not,	
and	if	yes,	why	yes?	The	general	question	here	is:	what	are	the	rules	for	deciding	which	
distributions	of	essentiality	and	accidentality	across	any	collection	of	co-instantiated	
properties	correspond	to	an	object	and	which	do	not?		
Such	considerations	lead	the	essentialist	two-thingist	to	the	following	forced	choice:	
either	(a)	provide	a	principle	of	essence-restriction,	whereby	some	distributions	of	
essentiality/accidentality	are	admissible	and	others	are	not,	or	(b)	openly	adopt	a	principle	
of	plenitude,	whereby	more	or	less	every	logically	coherent	distribution	of	essentiality	and	
accidentality	corresponds	to	a	numerically	distinct	object.	(Why	“more	or	less”?	We	will	see	
momentarily.)	
	 Out	of	pessimism	about	finding	a	workable	principle	of	essence-restriction,	a	
principle	that	would	not	be	overly	anthropocentric	and/or	uncomfortably	arbitrary,	many	
metaphysicians	have	recently	opted	for	Option	(b)	–	adopting	plenitude.	Recent	proponents	
include	Karen	Bennett	(2004),	John	Hawthorne	(2006),	Mark	Johnston	(2006:	697–8),	
Sarah-Jane	Leslie	(2011),	Shamik	Dasgupta	(2018:	547–8),	and	Maegan	Fairchild	(2019).	
But	in	fact	we	find	the	plenitude	thesis	defended	already	in	the	1980s,	under	different	
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names,	by	Kit	Fine	(1982:	100,	1999:	67,	73)	and	Stephen	Yablo	(1987:	302,	310).	Here	is	
how	Bennett	states	the	thesis	of	plenitude	(2004:	354):	
[E]very	region	of	space-time	that	contains	an	object	at	all	contains	a	distinct	object	for	every	possible	
way	of	distributing	‘essential’	and	‘accidental’	over	the	[non-modal,	non-sortal]	properties	actually	
instantiated	there.		
So:	For	any	region	R	occupied	by	a	concrete	particular	with	n	properties,	a	principle	of	
material	plenitude	might	be	expected	to	posit,	in	a	first	approximation,	2n	coincident	
material	objects	in	R.	This	is	only	a	first	approximation	for	several	reasons.	First,	the	sort	of	
properties	that	coincidents	do	not	share	(e.g.,	modal	properties)	would	not	go	into	this	
calculation.	Second,	some	properties	that	coincidents	do	share	(e.g.,	determinable	
properties)	cannot	vary	in	the	distribution	of	essentiality	and	accidentally	over	them	
independently	of	the	variation	across	other	properties	(e.g.,	maximally	determinate	
properties)	–	see	Bennett	2004:	357–8	and	Leslie	2011:	279.	Finally,	some	general	
metaphysical	principles	(e.g.,	that	no	object	can	have	all	its	properties	merely	accidentally)	
may	rule	out	certain	specific	distributions.	It	is	a	vexing	question	how	to	formulate	
plenitude	in	a	completely	general	and	principled	way	(Fairchild	2019).	But	this	is	not	our	
topic	here.	For	our	purposes,	it	would	suffice	to	say	the	following:	where	k	is	the	number	of	
logically	possible	distributions	of	essentiality/accidentality	ruled	out	by	one	of	the	above	
considerations	(or	another,	for	that	matter),	according	to	material	plenitude	(i)	there	are	
2n–k	coincident	objects	in	any	region	that	contains	one	object	with	n	properties	and	(ii)	k	is	
dwarfed	by	2n	(it	is	in	this	context	a	virtue	of	“dwarfed”	that	it	is	so	vague!).	
	 I	have	mentioned	plenitude’s	pedigree	in	the	metaphysics	of	the	past	half	century.	
But	the	truth	is	that	plenitude	has	an	even	longer	and	more	illustrious	history	within	the	
Aristotelian	tradition,	where	it	was	defended	by	Aristotle	(Matthews	1982),	Aquinas	
(Inman	2014),	and	Brentano	(Kriegel	2015).	In	Aristotle’s	repeated	discussions	of	the	
ontological	status	of	such	things	as	seated-Socrates	and	musical-Coriscus	–	referred	to	by	
Aristotle	scholars	as	“kooky	objects”	(following	Matthews	1982:	224)	–	Aristotle	insists	that	
(i)	there	are	such	entities	and	(ii)	they	are	not	identical	with	Socrates	and	Coriscus.	They	
are	not	identical	with	them	precisely	because	they	differ	in	their	identity	and	persistence	
conditions:	when	Socrates	stops	sitting,	seated-Socrates	goes	out	of	existence	but	Socrates	
does	not.	Moreover,	as	far	as	we	know	there	are	no	substantial	restrictions	on	which	
accidents	of	Socrates	could	be	used	to	generate	a	“Socrates-based”	kooky	object.	This	
collection	of	claims	very	much	points	in	the	direction	of	plenitude.	
	 Karen	Bennett,	who	introduced	the	term	“plenitude”	as	it	applies	in	this	context,	
does	not	offer	a	direct	argument	for	it,	and	indeed	does	not	quite	endorse	it,	claiming	that	
one-thingism	might	ultimately	be	more	plausible	(2004:	359).	Rather,	what	she	argues	is	
that	for	anyone	who	rejects	one-thingism,	there	is	no	stable	position	that	comes	short	of	all-
out	plenitude.	What	she	calls	“bazillion-thingism”	(356)	–	and	we	might	call	“2n-k-thingism”	
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–	is	more	stable	than	two-thingism,	three-thingism,	four-thingism,	and	so	on.	The	reason	for	
this,	recall,	is	that	the	prospects	for	identifying	a	position	in-between	one-thingism	and	all-
out	plenitude	that	would	be	neither	arbitrary	nor	anthropocentric	are	dim.		
	 We	may,	of	course,	put	together	this	consideration	with	the	little	argument	from	
section	3	to	produce	a	“big	argument”	whose	conclusion	is	plenitude.	We	do	this	by	adding	
the	following	to	the	little	argument:	
5) Either	(i)	one-thingism,	(ii)	plenitude,	or	(iii)	something	in-between;	
6) (i)	is	inconsistent	with	4;	
7) (iii)	is	infected	with	arbitrariness	and/or	anthropomorphism;	therefore,		
8) (ii),	i.e.,	plenitude.		
This	is	an	argument	by	elimination	for	plenitude,	which	takes	the	respective	problems	of	
one-thingism	and	intermediate	positions	between	one-thingism	and	plenitude	as	grounds	
for	eliminating	them,	leaving	only	plenitude	standing.		
It	is	not	my	purpose	here	to	evaluate	the	big	argument	for	plenitude.	I	only	want	to	
make	two	claims	about	this	argument:	first,	it	captures	schematically	the	standard	reason	
plenitudinists	have	for	their	view,	and	second,	this	reason	to	go	plenitudinist	should	appeal	
to	the	nominalist	just	as	much	as	to	anybody	else.	It	is	this	last	point	that	I	want	to	belabor	
next.	Of	the	three	premises	the	big	argument	adds	to	the	small	argument,	only	7	is	an	
independent,	substantial	(non-trivial)	claim.	Thus	anyone	who	accepts	premises	1,	3,	and	7	
of	the	big	argument	finds	herself	with	a	strong	reason	to	adopt	plenitude.	What	I	want	to	
argue	next	is	that	all	three	of	these	premises	are	available	to	a	nominalist	just	as	much	as	to	
an	anti-nominalist.		
	
5.		Plenitudinous	Nominalism	
	
Suppose	two	ontologists	chat	over	coffee	about	whether	they	should	be	one-	or	two-
thingists.	Should	it	make	any	difference	to	their	conversation	whether	one,	both,	or	neither	
is	a	nominalist?	The	topic	–	whether	a	statue	and	the	copper	it	is	made	of	are	one	or	two	
objects	–	seems	entirely	orthogonal	to	their	commitments	over	the	existence	of	universals,	
states	of	affairs,	and	so	on.	As	long	as	both	believe	that	there	are	material	objects,	they	can	
debate	the	question	about	SoL	and	Cooper.	It	is	unclear	what	input	into	the	dialectic	might	
the	existence	of	universals	make.	
	 The	case	for	two-thingism	starts	with	the	simple	pretheoretic	intuition	that	in	some	
situations	which	we	can	easily	conceive,	and	which	do	not	seem	to	involve	any	hidden	
incoherence,	SoL	would	go	out	of	existence	but	Cooper	would	not.	Since	this	intuition	is	
altogether	pretheoretic,	we	should	not	expect	one’s	theoretical	commitments	regarding	the	
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existence	of	universals	–	an	entirely	separate	matter	anyway	–	to	affect	one’s	inclination	to	
share	the	intuition.	As	noted	in	section	3,	this	intuition,	when	endorsed,	needs	only	to	be	
supplemented	with	the	principle	of	the	necessity	of	identity	to	yield	two-thingism.	And	the	
case	for	the	necessity	of	identity,	too,	is	something	the	nominalist	has	just	as	much	reason	
to	accept	as	anybody	else.	Recall	Kripke’s	straightforward	argument	for	the	necessity	of	
identity:	it	featured	only	quantifiers,	identity,	and	variables	ranging	over	individual	objects;	
it	did	not	feature	any	predicates.	So,	no	part	of	this	argument	depends	for	its	plausibility	on	
some	idea	problematic	for	a	nominalist.	Again,	then,	one’s	commitment	to	nominalism	
should	not	have	any	effect	on	one’s	attraction	to	the	necessity	of	identity.	Therefore:	the	
little	argument	from	section	3	should	be	as	seductive	to	the	nominalist	as	it	is	to	an	anti-
nominalist	or	an	agnostic.			
	 It	is	true	that	in	explaining	the	non-identity	of	SoL	and	Cooper,	the	nominalist	could	
not	appeal	to	properties	or	to	ways	objects	have	them.	So	the	most	common	account	of	the	
non-identity	of	SoL	and	Cooper,	the	account	in	terms	of	which	properties	are	had	
essentially	and	which	accidentally,	is	unavailable	to	the	nominalist.	It	is	important	to	keep	
in	mind,	however,	that	while	this	is	a	nice	explanation	of	the	non-identity	of	SoL	and	
Cooper,	it	is	not	what	gives	us	the	original	motivation	for	believing	in	non-identity.	Even	if	
essentialism	turns	out	to	be	false,	such	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	there	are	two	ways	for	
objects	to	have	properties,	we	would	still	have	ample	reason	to	posit	two	distinct	objects	
there.	Indeed,	it	would	be	the	same	reason,	namely,	that	we	can	imagine	circumstances	in	
which	SoL	goes	out	of	existence	but	Cooper	does	not	(and	identity	is	necessary).	We	would	
then	have	to	come	up	with	some	other	account	of	the	non-identity	of	SoL	and	Cooper.		
This	is	the	predicament	the	nominalist	is	in:	one	must	come	up	with	an	alternative	
account	of	this	non-identity	–	an	account,	in	fact,	that	does	not	mention	properties	at	all.	
Most	naturally,	the	nominalist	could	treat	this	non-identity	as	brute:	SoL	is	one	thing,	
Cooper	is	another,	and	that	is	all	there	is	to	it.	Such	appeal	to	brutal	individuation	is	not	
going	to	be	embarrassing	to	nominalists,	since	arguably	they	are	committed	to	it	regardless.	
For	consider:	nominalists	should	be	able	to	say,	with	the	essentialist	and	everybody	else,	
that	Socrates	and	Plato	are	two	distinct	objects.	But	no	nominalist	would	account	for	this	in	
terms	of	the	differences	between	Socrates’s	and	Plato’s	properties.	When	countenancing	
properties	at	all,	the	nominalist	explains	property-identity	and	-difference	in	terms	of	
object-identity	and	-difference,	not	the	other	way	round.	And	furthermore,	there	is	no	other	
kind	of	entity	E	such	that	the	nominalist	could	ground	object	identity/difference	in	E	
identity/difference,	as	that	would	cast	E	as	more	fundamental	than	objects	–	whereas	for	
the	nominalist	objects	are	the	ungrounded	grounds	of	reality.	So,	it	is	only	natural	for	the	
nominalist	to	treat	the	individuation	of	objects	as	ultimate	–	something	we	cannot	“get	
underneath.”3	
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In	other	words,	it	is	plausible	that	in	any	one-category	ontology,	the	entities	of	the	
one	fundamental	category	must	be	individuated	brutally,	for	precisely	this	reason.	Since	
nominalism	is	a	one-category	ontology	in	which	individual	objects	are	the	one	fundamental	
category,	we	should	expect	nominalism	to	embrace	brutal	individuation	of	individual	
objects.	So	the	nominalist	would	treat	even	Socrates	and	Plato	as	brutally	non-identical,	and	
could	(should?)	then	do	the	same	with	SoL	and	Cooper:	they	are	two	different	things,	and	
that	is	all	there	is	to	it.		
As	we	have	seen	in	section	4,	from	two-thingism	to	material	plenitude	the	step	is	
relatively	short.	It	is	based	on	the	contention	that	it	is	just	very	difficult	to	identify	a	stable	
position	intermediate	between	one-thingism	and	all-out	plenitude,	that	is,	to	formulate	a	
principle	of	essence-restriction	that	does	not	rely	on	arbitrary	or	anthropocentric	
distinctions.	Here	too,	there	is	no	reason	why	a	nominalist	should	not	feel	the	force	of	this	
consideration.	To	be	clear,	my	point	right	now	is	not	that	the	plenitudinist	is	right	that	there	
is	no	stable	position	in-between	one-thingism	and	plenitude.	It	is	only	that	whether	or	not	
that	is	so	is	independent	of	whether	concrete	particulars	individuate	by	essential	
properties,	by	haecceities,	brutally,	or	otherwise.	What	provides	the	original	motivation	for	
skepticism	about	a	stable	intermediary	position	between	one-thingism	and	plenitude	is	not	
the	claim	that	properties	can	be	had	either	essentially	or	accidentally;	it	is	the	claim	that	
any	such	intermediary	position	would	be	guilty	of	inadmissible	arbitrariness	and/or	
anthropomorphism.	Again,	this	claim	is	something	that	a	nominalist	can	be	impressed	with	
just	as	much	as	anybody	else.	
The	point	I	have	been	trying	to	make	so	far	in	this	section	is	this.	Although	
proponents	of	plenitude	often	work	within	an	essentialist	framework	for	object	
individuation	–	work	with	it	so	tightly,	in	fact,	that	they	typically	formulate	plenitude	in	
essentialist	terms	–	this	essentialist	view	is	neither	(a)	the	only	possible	account	of	object	
individuation	nor	(b)	the	original	source	of	motivation	for	plenitude.	To	expand	on	(a):	It	is	
not	the	only	possible	account,	because	as	noted,	objects	may	individuate	by	haecceities	or	
brutally	(and	there	are	other	views	of	object	individuation	as	well).	For	reasons	we	have	
seen,	nominalists	are	more	or	less	compelled	to	adopt	brutal	individuation	of	objects.	So	
this	is	what	a	nominalist	would	likely	do	who	wished	to	adopt	plenitude.	To	expand	now	on	
(b):	the	essentialist	view	is	not	what	originally	motivates	plenitude,	because	as	noted,	the	
original	motivation	comes	from	premises	(1),	(3),	and	(7)	in	the	big	argument.	That	is,	it	
comes	from	the	joint	dialectical	weight	of	(i)	the	intuition	that	there	are	possible	scenarios	
where	a	material	object	goes	out	of	existence	but	its	matter	does	not,	(ii)	the	principle	of	the	
necessity	of	identity,	and	(iii)	the	difficulty	of	finding	a	principled,	stable,	non-arbitrary,	
non-anthropomorphizing	position	in-between	one-thingism	and	plenitude.	All	three	points	
are	available	to	the	nominalist.	For	they	do	not	presuppose	essentialism.	Essentialism	shows	
up	only	later	in	the	story,	as	part	of	a	potential	account	of	the	thus-motivated	non-identity	
of	many	coincidents.		
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It	is	true,	I	have	granted,	that	the	availability	of	an	explanation	or	account	often	
deepens	our	confidence	in	philosophical	claims	motivated	by	independent	considerations.	
To	that	extent,	the	essentialist	explanation	of	the	non-identity	of	coincidents	should	make	a	
plenitudinist	extra	confident.	Still,	its	non-availability	should	not	make	the	plenitudinist	
unconfident,	since	it	is	not	what	motivates	plenitude	in	the	first	place.	And	this	means	that	
there	is	strong	motivation	to	adopt	plenitude	that	a	nominalist	can	appreciate.		
Suppose	the	nominalist	does	adopt	plenitude,	positing	in	the	region	where	SoL	
stands	a	bewildering	multitude	of	perfectly	colocated	objects.	Using	the	Aristotelian	naming	
scheme,	we	might	say	that	in	addition	to	SoL,	there	are	in	this	region	also	m-massed-SoL,	
verdigris-SoL,	93-meter-tall-SoL,	and	so	on.	An	essentialist	who	posited	these	objects	would	
characterize	them	as	follows:	m-massed-SoL	is	the	concrete	particular	which	has	essentially	
all	the	properties	that	SoL	has	essentially	but	also	has	essentially	one	property	that	SoL	has	
accidentally,	namely,	the	property	of	having	mass	m;	verdigris-SoL	is	the	concrete	
particular	which	has	essentially	all	the	properties	that	SoL	has	essentially	but	also	has	
essentially	one	property	that	SoL	has	accidentally,	namely,	the	property	of	being	verdigris;	
and	so	on.	This	essentialist	characterization	is	unavailable	to	the	nominalist,	adverting	as	it	
does	to	properties.	Nonetheless,	our	nominalist	posits	the	exact	same	objects,	with	the	exact	
same	identity	and	persistence	conditions.	It	is	just	that	differences	among	these	objects’	
identity	and	persistence	conditions	are	treated	here	as	primitive,	as	something	we	cannot	
get	underneath	or	explain.	This	is	not	some	ad	hoc	position	our	nominalist	wheels	in	to	
buttress	a	desire	to	go	plenitudinist:	brutal	individuation	of	concrete	particulars	is	part	and	
parcel	of	an	ontology	that	recognizes	only	concrete	particulars	as	fundamental	entities.	
On	the	emerging	ontological	view,	ours	is	a	world	of	massively	colocated	concrete	
particulars.	The	world	is	made	up	entirely	of	concrete	particulars,	but	there	are	many	more	
of	those	than	“folk	ontology”	recognizes.	I	call	this	view	plenitudinous	nominalism.	I	find	it	
an	intriguing	ontology,	but	more	importantly,	I	now	want	to	show,	it	provides	satisfactory	
nominalistic	truthmakers	for	simple	predicative	truths	like	“SoL	is	M.”		
	
6.		Plenitudinous	Nominalism	and	the	Truthmaker	Argument	
	
I	have	suggested	that	nominalists	have	a	reason	to	embrace	plenitude,	namely,	the	same	
reason	anybody	has	to	do	so.	But	do	nominalists	have	a	reason	to	embrace	plenitude	
specifically	in	their	capacity	as	nominalists?	That	is,	is	there	anything	a	nominalist	stands	to	
gain	qua	nominalist	from	doing	so?	In	this	section,	I	want	to	argue	that	plenitude	helps	the	
nominalist	solve	the	problem	of	predication	without	universals,	that	is,	helps	provide	
nominalistic	truthmakers	for	simple	predications	like	“SoL	is	M.”		
	
15 
The	thought	behind	the	truthmaker	argument,	recall,	is	that	there	must	be	
something	the	very	existence	of	which	necessitates	and	explains	the	truth	of	“SoL	is	M,”	and	
while	the	existence	of	SoL	necessitates	and	fully	explains	the	truth	of	“SoL	exists,”	it	neither	
necessitates	nor	fully	explains	the	truth	of	“SoL	is	M,”	which	has	some	extra	information	in	
it	clearly	not	mentioned	in	“SoL	exists.”	For	Armstrong,	what	necessitates	(and,	we	may	add,	
also	explains)	the	truth	of	“SoL	is	M”	is	the	existence	of	the	state	of	affairs	of	SoL-being-M,	
and	this	state	of	affairs	is	not	a	concrete	particular,	if	only	because	it	has	a	universal	for	a	
constituent.		
Plenitudinist	nominalism	offers	a	new	approach	to	this	problem.	The	basic	idea	is	
this:	it	is	not	the	existence	of	SoL	that	necessitates	and	explains	the	truth	of	“SoL	has	mass	
m,”	but	the	existence	of	m-massed-SoL.	Because,	and	so	long	as,	m-massed-SoL	exists,	“SoL	
has	mass	m”	is	true.	If	and	when	m-massed-SoL	goes	out	of	existence,	“SoL	has	mass	m”	
would	become	false,	as	nothing	would	ground	its	truth.	This	is	the	suggestion;	now	let	us	
see	why	it	is	plausible.		
As	noted	in	section	1,	the	existence	of	SoL	does	not	necessitate	the	truth	of	“SoL	has	
mass	m,”	because	SoL’s	existence	is	consistent	with	SoL	losing	some	of	its	mass,	hence	
consistent	with	the	falsity	of	“SoL	has	mass	m.”	In	contrast,	the	existence	of	m-massed-SoL	
is	inconsistent	with	SoL	losing	(or	gaining)	any	mass,	since	m-massed-SoL	is	precisely	that	
concrete	particular	which	coincides	with	SoL	but	would	go	out	of	existence	if	SoL	were	to	
change	in	mass.	The	existence	of	m-massed-SoL	is	thus	inconsistent	with	the	falsity	of	“SoL	
has	mass	m.”	It	necessitates	the	truth	of	“SoL	has	mass	m.”		
In	addition,	the	existence	of	m-massed-SoL	fully	explains	the	truth	of	“SoL	has	mass	
m.”	We	noted	that	SoL’s	existence	explains	only	the	truth	of	“SoL	exists,”	which	lacks	some	
information	present	in	“SoL	has	mass	m.”	However,	what	m-massed-SoL’s	existence	
explains	fully	is,	in	the	first	instance,	the	truth	of	“m-massed-SoL	exists.”	The	latter	appears	
to	recapture	the	information	lost	in	“SoL	exists”	but	present	in	“SoL	has	mass	m.”	This	is	not	
because	“m-massed-SoL”	alludes	to	SoL’s	mass;	“m-massed-SoL”	is	a	proper	name	and	does	
not	allude	to	anything	(except	illicitly,	winkingly,	through	my	choice	of	a	suggestive	label!).	
Rather,	what	does	the	explaining	here	is	the	nature	–	or	perhaps	just:	the	identity	and	
persistence	conditions	–	of	the	object	thereby	named.	Indeed,	it	is	because	the	name	“m-
massed-SoL”	winks	suggestively	at	the	right	identity	and	persistence	conditions	that	I	have	
chosen	it	to	name	the	relevant	object.	But	it	is	the	nature	of	the	object,	as	reflected	in	its	
identity	and	persistence	conditions,	that	fully	explain	why	“SoL	has	mass	m”	is	guaranteed	
to	be	true	so	long	as	that	object	exists.	
One	somewhat	traditional	way	to	think	of	this	is	as	follows.	The	existence	of	m-
massed-SoL	straightforwardly	explains	the	truth	“m-massed-SoL	exists.”	Arguably,	now,	“m-
massed-SoL	exists”	is	a	legitimate	paraphrase	of	“SoL	has	mass	m,”	since	they	non-
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incidentally	have	the	same	truth	conditions.	Now,	insofar	as	the	truth	of	“m-massed-SoL	
exists”	is	explained	by	some	entity	E,	and	“m-massed-SoL	exists”	paraphrases	“SoL	has	mass	
m,”	we	should	consider	that	E	also	explains	the	truth	of	“SoL	has	mass	m.”	And	so	it	would	
appear	that	m-massed-SoL’s	existence	explains	the	truth	of	“SoL	has	mass	m.”	
I	conclude	that	plenitudinous	nominalism	manages	to	provide	suitable	truthmakers	
for	simple	predicative	truths.	Interestingly,	it	manages	to	do	so	while	avoiding	the	
difficulties	we	saw	with	class	nominalism’s	attempt	to	do	the	same.	A	central	problem	with	
class	nominalism	was	its	apparent	appeal	to	a	(presumably	repeatable)	membership	
relation;	the	proposed	truthmaker	of	“SoL	has	mass	m”	being	the	fact	that	SoL	is	a	member	
of	the	class	of	all	and	only	m-massed	things.	Plenitudinous	nominalism,	in	contrast,	makes	
no	appeal	to	classes,	nor	therefore	to	membership	in	them.	In	fact,	it	appeals	to	nothing	but	
one	concrete	particular	as	the	truthmaker	of	“SoL	has	mass	m.”	This	is	the	gold	standard	for	
nominalism.		
Also	significant	is	the	fact	that	in	plenitudinous	nominalism	no	other	entity	is	
involved	in	making	true	an	intrinsic	predication	such	as	“has	mass	m.”	As	we	saw,	for	class	
nominalism	the	truthmaker	of	“SoL	has	mass	m”	is	SoL’s	relation	to	a	certain	class	of	
objects,	whereas	an	object’s	mass	is	intrinsic	to	it	and	it	is	unclear	what	relevance	any	other	
object	has	to	whether	“x	has	such-and-such	mass”	is	true.	As	James	Van	Cleve	has	argued,	
friends	of	universals	are	guilty	of	a	similar	irregularity,	finding	a	truthmaker	for	“SoL	has	
mass	m”	in	SoL’s	relation	to	a	certain	universal,	namely,	m-mass-ness.	This,	notes	Van	Cleve,	
“make[s]	what	is	intrinsic	to	objects	consist	in	a	relation	to	something	else”	(1994:	582).	In	
contrast,	in	plenitudinous	nominalism	the	truthmaker	of	“SoL	has	mass	m”	is	just	a	certain	
individual,	m-massed-SoL,	and	any	relations	this	individual	may	or	may	not	bear	to	
anything	else	are	entirely	immaterial.	
Most	crucially,	no	possibilia	are	invoked	by	plenitudinous	nominalism.	Such	objects	
as	m-massed-SoL	and	verdigris-SoL	inhabit	comfortably	the	actual	world	–	you	can	see	
them	next	time	you	visit	New	York.	And	such	objects	suffice	to	provide	adequate	
truthmakers	for	coextensive	and	single-instance	predications.	The	truthmaker	of	“The	
cosmos	has	a	mass	of	10100	kg”	would	be	the	object,	coincident	with	the	cosmos,	that	we	
may	call	“10100kg-massed-cosmos.”	As	for	“Socrates	is	renate”	and	“Socrates	is	cordate,”	
according	to	plenitudinous	nominalism	the	truthmaker	of	“Socrates	is	renate”	is	renate-
Socrates,	while	the	truthmaker	of	“Socrates	is	cordate”	is	cordate-Socrates.	Importantly,	
positing	two	different	coincidents	here	–	renate-Socrates	and	cordate-Socrates	–	is	not	an	
ad	hoc	move	tailored	to	generate	the	right	number	of	truthmakers.	The	plenitudinous	
nominalist	is	justified	in	treating	renate-Socrates	and	cordate-Socrates	as	different	because	
there	are	two	separate	identity	and	persistence	conditions	for	objects	to	“inhabit”	here:	if	
Socrates	lost	his	kidneys,	renate-Socrates	would	go	out	of	existence,	but	cordate-Socrates	
would	not.		
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This,	then,	is	the	novel	nominalist	approach	to	predication	without	universals	that	I	
have	promised.	It	relies	on	a	new	version	of	nominalism,	one	which	combines	nominalism’s	
“world	of	concrete	particulars”	with	a	plenitude	of	coincident	concrete	particulars.	Note	
well:	I	have	argued	here	neither	for	nominalism	nor	for	material	plenitude.	My	goal	has	
been	modest:	to	point	out	the	coherence	of	a	version	of	nominalism,	obtained	by	integrating	
into	it	a	plenitude	of	colocated	concrete	particulars,	that	has	the	resources	to	provide	
truthmakers	which	both	necessitate	and	fully	explain	the	truth	of	predicative	statements	of	
the	form	“x	is	F.”		
I	mentioned	at	the	opening	that	overcoming	one	problem	does	not	a	full	case	for	
nominalism	make.	Plenitudinous	nominalism	faces	at	least	three	further	kinds	of	challenge:	
handling	statements	of	the	form	“x	is	F”	featuring	objects	and	predicates	from	more	
problematic	domains	(e.g.,	mathematical	objects,	relational	predicates);	handling	other	
types	of	statements	(notably	of	truth-functional	and	quantificational	form);	satisfying	
desiderata	not	pertaining	to	the	provision	of	truthmakers	(e.g.,	fitting	a	conception	of	the	
world	suggested	by	fundamental	science).	There	are	also	various	decision	points	for	
plenitude	nominalists,	for	instance	on	the	question	of	whether	some	concrete	particulars	
are	more	fundamental	than	others,	and	in	particular,	whether	some	coincidents	are	more	
fundamental	than	others.		
Obviously,	spelling	out	the	full	case	for	plenitudinist	nominalism,	identifying	its	
various	versions,	and	choosing	which	might	be	the	most	plausible,	is	not	a	task	for	a	single	
paper.	Here	my	goal	has	been	modest:	to	motivate	the	idea	that	nominalists	should	take	
seriously	the	option	of	incorporating	material	plenitude	into	their	ontology,	as	providing	
particularly	promising	resources	for	addressing	the	fairly	foundational	question	of	what,	in	
a	world	devoid	of	universals,	makes	true	simple	predicative	statements.	
	
7.		Interlude:	Lewis	on	His	Deathbed	
	
In	a	paper	published	two	years	after	his	death,	Lewis	(2003)	floated	a	new	approach	to	
predication	without	universals.	The	approach	is	striking	because	it	follows	the	same	
reasoning	we	do,	but	veering	off	at	a	crucial	juncture	because	material	plenitude	is	not	
contemplated	seriously.	Considering	a	black	cat	named	Long,	Lewis	writes	this	about	the	
truthmaker	of	“Long	is	black”	(2003:	30):	
Imagine	something,	call	it	Long	qua	black,	that	is	very	like	Long	in	most	ways	but	differs	from	him	in	
essence.	Long	is	accidentally	black,	and	might	have	been	striped,	orange	all	over,	or	even	green.	Long	
qua	black,	however,	is	essentially	black.	.	.	Long	qua	black,	if	there	were	such	a	thing,	would	be	a	
truthmaker	for	the	truth	that	Long	is	black.		
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So	far,	the	approach	is	identical	to	ours.	The	only	difference	is	that	the	object	we	would	
name	“black-Long,”	using	the	Aristotelian	naming	scheme	for	kooky	objects,	is	called	by	
Lewis	“Long-qua-black”	(which	in	fact	echoes	Kit	Fine’s	1982	naming	scheme	in	his	own	
defense	of	plenitude).	
	 To	end	up	with	plenitudinous	nominalism,	Lewis	would	only	need	to	adopt	our	view	
about	the	relationship	between	Long	and	black-Long,	that	is,	the	view	that	they	are	
coincident	but	numerically	distinct	objects.	But	that	is	not	in	fact	what	Lewis	does	(2003:	
31):	
I	deny	that	Long	qua	black	is	a	novel	and	peculiar	sort	of	thing.	Long	qua	black	is	none	other	than	
Long	himself.	.	.	Long	qua	black	is	Long,	yet	the	two	of	them	have	different	essences.	How	can	this	one	
thing,	Long	qua	black/Long,	be	essentially	black	and	also	be	only	accidentally	black?	My	answer,	of	
course,	is	that	he	has	different	essences	under	different	counterpart	relations.		
Bracketing	the	technicalities,	what	Lewis	is	doing	here	is	insisting	on	one-thingism	about	
coincidents	and	wheeling	in	the	apparatus	of	his	concretist	modal	realism	to	make	sense	of	
the	thought-experimental	scenarios	that	push	us	away	from	one-thingism.		
	 If	we	have	to	lean	either	on	material	plenitude	or	on	concretist	modal	realism	to	
make	sense	of	predication	without	universals,	I	think	it	would	be	far	more	modest	to	appeal	
to	plenitude	(more	on	this	below).	For	this	reason,	I	would	recommend	to	those	who	want	
to	make	the	world	safe	for	nominalism	to	do	so	by	incorporating	material	plenitude	into	
their	ontology	rather	than	concretist	modal	realism.	That	is,	I	would	recommend	the	
adoption	of	plenitudinous	nominalism.	I	close	now	with	a	defense	of	plenitudinous	
nominalism	against	certain	objections	or	doubts	that	are	likely	to	occur	to	the	reader.	
	
8.		Is	the	Cost	Too	High?	
	
One	might	understandably	resist	plenitudinist	nominalism	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	
somehow	extravagant.	It	ought	to	be	embarrassing	to	nominalists,	constitutionally	proud	as	
they	are	of	their	taste	for	“desert	landscapes,”	that	they	must	resort	to	kooky	objects	to	
provide	truthmakers	for	simple	everyday	truths.	They	are	called	kooky	for	a	reason,	after	
all	–	and	there	are	so	many	of	them!	This	reaction	is	understandable,	but	I	want	to	argue	
that	not	much	of	it	survives	close	scrutiny.		
Start	with	the	notion	of	parsimony.	It	is	customary	to	distinguish	between	qualitative	
and	quantitative	parsimony:	the	former	is	a	matter	of	positing	as	few	types	of	entity	as	
possible,	the	latter	as	few	token	entities	as	possible.	Some	metaphysicians	(e.g.,	Lewis	1986)	
have	argued	that	quantitative	parsimony	has	no	role	to	play	in	metaphysical	theorizing:	
ontologists	may	reasonably	debate	whether	there	are	strawberries	or	only	particles	
arranged	strawberry-wise,	but	just	how	many	token	strawberries	or	token	particles	there	
	
19 
might	be	is	not	the	ontologist’s	business.	Other	metaphysicians	(e.g.,	Nolan	1997)	have	
claimed	that	quantitative	parsimony	does	have	a	role	to	play	in	metaphysical	theorizing.	
Still,	it	is	quite	clear	that	in	metaphysics	qualitative	parsimony	is	more	theoretically	
valuable	than	quantitative.	And	this	is	significant,	because	as	a	one-category	ontology,	
plenitudinous	nominalism	is	maximally	qualitatively	parsimonious.	Its	alleged	sins	are	
against	quantitative	parsimony.		
More	interestingly,	it	is	not	clear	that	plenitudinous	nominalism	is	as	quantitatively	
profligate	as	all	that.	Suppose	we	shunned	kooky	objects	such	as	m-massed-SoL	and	
grounded	the	truth	of	“SoL	is	M”	in	a	state	of	affairs	consisting	of	SoL’s	instantiation	of	a	
universal	of	m-massed-ness.	We	would	save	ourselves	a	large	quantity	of	token	concrete	
particulars,	but	would	presumably	incur	just	as	many	token	states	of	affairs:	m-massed-SoL	
would	no	longer	be	part	of	our	ontology,	but	the	state	of	affairs	of	SoL-being-m-massed	
would	(and	with	it	SoL	and	the	property	of	being	m-massed,	incidentally).	More	generally,	a	
state-of-affairs	ontology	posits	forsooth	just	as	many	token	entities	as	plenitudinous	
nominalism;	it	is	just	that	one’s	plentiful	tokens	are	states	of	affairs	while	the	other’s	are	
concrete	particulars.	So	at	least	as	compared	to	a	standard	state-of-affairs	ontology,	
plenitudinous	nominalism	fares	quite	well	even	on	the	quantitative-parsimony	front.4		
It	also	fares	well	as	compared	to	other	versions	of	nominalism.	As	we	have	seen,	
many	nominalists	are	forced	to	embrace	concrete	possibilia	to	handle	coextensive	and	
single-instance	predications.	Clearly,	there	are	many	more	merely	possible	objects	than	
kooky	objects,	if	only	because	the	latter	are	a	proper	subset	of	the	former	(even	if	you	deny	
that	there	is	an	object	just	like	Socrates	but	essentially	seated,	it	is	hard	to	see	why	there	
could	not	be	such	an	object).	It	is	of	course	perfectly	coherent	for	a	nominalist	to	reject	both	
possibilia	and	kooky	objects.	But	the	question	is	whether	any	such	nominalist	can	provide	
adequate	truthmakers	for	truths	of	the	form	“x	is	F.”	Obviously,	if	this	is	possible,	then	
plenitudinous	nominalism	is	de	trop.	But	if	it	turns	out	that	a	viable	nominalism	must	
appeal	to	either	possibilia	or	kooky	objects,	then	appealing	to	kooky	objects	is	far	more	
parsimonious	and	more	conservative.		
So	much	for	the	parsimony	concern.	As	regards	the	concern	about	the	kookiness	of	
kooky	objects,	here	too	it	is	useful	to	put	things	in	perspective.	First	of	all,	contemporary	
metaphysics	has	found	it	difficult	to	avoid	oddities	in	the	ontology	of	material	objects.	
Certainly	concrete	possibilia	are	extraordinarily	strange.	But	more	interestingly,	many	
strange	objects	have	become	orthodox	in	contemporary	metaphysics,	even	outside	the	
context	of	trying	to	defend	a	nominalistic	ontology.	Thus,	many	embrace	mereological	
universalism,	and	so	posit	such	concrete	particulars	as	the	fusion	of	SoL,	the	moon,	and	my	
left	index	finger.	In	comparison,	m-massed-SoL	is	not	that	weird.	Certainly	it	is	unclear	why	
we	should	frown	on	material	plenitude	while	showing	so	much	tolerance	for	unbridled	
mereological	composition.	The	two	doctrines	are	at	bottom	rather	similar,	and	similarly	
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motivated	(Fairchild	2020:	2–3):	just	as	there	appears	to	be	no	non-arbitrary	way	to	rule	in	
some	putative	composites	and	rule	out	others,	so	there	appears	to	be	no	non-arbitrary	way	
to	rule	in	some	putative	coincidents	but	rule	out	others.5	What	softens	the	blow	with	all	
these	unusual	entities	is	that,	as	concrete	particulars,	they	are	the	kind	of	thing	with	which	
we	have	familiarity.		
Furthermore,	we	must	ask	ourselves	whether	something	like	the	state	of	affairs	of	
SoL	being	m-massed	is	any	less	odd,	on	reflection,	than	the	kooky	object	m-massed-SoL.	The	
state	of	affairs	is	not	just	the	co-occurrence	of	SoL	and	being	m-massed:	something	must	
“glue”	them	together	into	a	state	of	affairs.	That	is,	there	is	also	the	instantiation	of	m-
massed-ness	by	SoL.	And	the	nature	of	instantiation,	the	“metaphysical	glue”	that	turns	
objects	and	properties	(or	relations)	into	states	of	affairs,	is	a	renowned	conundrum.	On	
pain	of	Bradley’s	regress,	it	cannot	be	understood	as	any	ordinary	relation.6	It	must	be	some	
je	ne	sais	quoi	that	no	one	has	yet	managed	to	understand.	Armstrong	himself	spent	the	
better	part	of	a	lifetime	circling	this	conundrum,	without	ever	reaching	satisfaction.	For	
most	of	his	career,	he	referred	to	that	which	holds	together	SoL	and	m-massed-ness	within	
the	relevant	state	of	affairs	as	a	“non-relational	tie.”	But	notwithstanding	the	appellation,	
what	this	tie	ties	are	after	all	two	numerically	distinct	entities,	and	it	is	unclear	what	
content	the	notion	of	relation	is	supposed	to	have	that	goes	beyond	the	linking	of	two	
separate	entities	(cf.	Van	Cleve	1994:	583).	There	are	other	approaches	to	instantiation,	of	
course,	but	the	philosophical	world	as	a	whole	has	reached	little	satisfaction	in	this	area.	It	
is	thus	a	major	asset	of	plenitudinous	nominalism	that	it	allows	us	to	avoid	altogether	the	
veritable	can	of	worms	that	is	instantiation/metaphysical	glue.	
One	central	source	of	instinctive	resistance	to	nominalism,	I	suspect,	comes	from	the	
subject-predicate	structure	of	our	language.	This	structure	inclines	us	to	see	reality	as	
structured	in	a	parallel	way,	comprising	concrete	particulars	denoted	by	subject	terms	and	
universals	denoted	by	predicate	terms,	perhaps	held	together	by	whatever	the	copula	
stands	for.	But	on	reflection,	we	should	probably	resist	the	biasing	effect	of	these	linguistic	
facts.	If	nominalism	is	true,	then	reality	is	but	a	vast	collection	of	concrete	particulars,	and	
any	language	that	reflected	accurately	that	reality	would	have	to	consist	in	nothing	but	an	
enormous	collection	of	proper	names.	Such	a	language	would	be	just	as	unlearnable	and	
useless	in	everyday	life	as	a	monetary	system	that	had	one	bill	for	$16.37,	one	bill	for	
$16.38,	one	for	$16.39,	and	so	on	for	every	possible	price	some	good	or	service	might	have.	
In	both	cases,	a	practical	system	requires	a	compositional	structure	featuring	a	limited	
collection	of	recombinable	items.	But	reality	itself	owes	nothing	to	our	representational	
goals	and	limitations:	$1,	$5,	$10,	$20,	and	$50	is	no	more	ontologically	privileged	a	
collection	of	prices	than	$16.37,	$16.38,	and	$16.39;	and	likewise,	Socrates,	Plato,	and	
Aristotle	is	no	more	ontologically	privileged	a	collection	of	objects	than	seated-Socrates,	
entertaining-Plato,	and	wise-Aristotle.	
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The	point	here	is	that	to	represent	reality	we	need	to	use	a	compositional	language	
featuring	a	subject-predicate	structure	whether	or	not	reality	is	comprised	of	objects-cum-
property	structures	(“states	of	affairs”).	That	is,	our	statements,	true	statements	included,	
have	to	be	syntactically	structured	regardless	of	whether	their	worldly	truthmakers	are	
correspondingly	ontologically	structured.	Accordingly,	we	should	resist	the	temptation	to	
infer,	from	the	fact	that	our	language	is	so	structured,	that	reality	is	similarly	structured.	
To	see	just	how	unnatural	it	is	for	us	to	think	of	the	world	nominalistically,	consider	
how	natural	it	is	to	raise	the	following	objection.	It	is	all	very	nice	that	Verdigris-SoL	exists,	
but	“SoL	is	verdigris”	is	about	SoL,	not	some	other	object	colocated	with	it.	Why	should	a	
truth	about	SoL	(especially	an	intrinsic	truth)	be	explained	by	a	different	object,	one	that	
coincides	with	SoL	but	is	numerically	distinct	from	it?	The	plenitudinous	nominalist	must	of	
course	insist	that	ultimately	all	you	do	when	you	utter	“SoL	is	verdigris”	is	assert	the	
existence	of	a	certain	individual,	so	the	distinction	between	what	a	statement	is	“about,”	on	
the	one	hand,	and	what	comment	it	makes	about	what	it	is	about,	on	the	other,	is	a	
superficial	feature	of	language	due	entirely	to	the	practical	pressures	driving	language-
design;	or	more	precisely,	all	there	is	in	the	world	to	make	true	such	a	statement	is	the	
existence	of	a	specific	concrete	particular,	Verdigris-SoL.	Clearly,	this	way	of	understanding	
what	we	do	when	we	assert	“SoL	is	verdigris,”	or	what	in	the	world	corresponds	to	
whatever	we	think	we	are	doing	in	asserting	“SoL	is	verdigris,”	is	completely	foreign	and	
unnatural	to	us.		
	Indeed,	there	are	legitimate	questions	about	exactly	which	of	the	many	coincidents	is	
the	lawful	referent	of	natural-language	names	such	as	“the	Statue	of	Liberty”	and	“Socrates.”	
The	labeling	system	we	have	been	using	–	whereby	one	coincident	gets	a	simple,	
straightforward	name	like	“Socrates,”	while	all	others	get	derivative-sounding	names	like	
“Greek-Socrates”	and	“seated-Socrates”	–	suggests	that	there	is	a	fact	of	the	matter	about	
which	among	the	many	coincidents	is	the	real,	honest-to-goodness	Socrates.	In	reality,	
while	a	version	of	plenitude	is	epistemically	possible	that	would	single	out	a	unique	lawful	
referent	of	“Socrates,”	a	more	realistic	version	would	allow	quite	a	few	–	probably	very	
many	–	coincidents	with	a	legitimate	claim	to	be	the	referent	of	“Socrates.”	On	this	view,	
there	may	be	a	number	of	more-or-less	“equally	good”	eligible	referents	of	“Socrates,”	with	
natural	language	infected	by	widespread	referential	indeterminacy.	Elsewhere,	I	have	
argued	precisely	for	this	view	(Kriegel	2019,	but	see	already	Bennett	2004:	361	and	Leslie	
2011:	281).	From	this	perspective,	it	would	really	be	more	cautious	to	start	with	such	
names	as	“object-qua-mortal,”	“object-qua-snubnosed,”	“object-qua-teacher-of-Plato,”	
“object-qua-mortal-snubnosed-teacher-of-Plato,”	and	so	on	–	and	then	address	separately	
the	question	of	which	among	these	may	lay	a	claim	to	co-refer	with	the	natural-language	
name	“Socrates.”		
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At	the	end	of	the	day,	incredulity	at	kooky	objects	may	persist.	Of	course,	such	
incredulity	should	greet	all	versions	of	plenitude,	not	just	nominalist	ones.	The	last	thing	I	
want	to	say	about	this	is	to	repeat	that	entities	foreign	to	“folk	ontology”	are	par	for	the	
course	in	metaphysics.	It	is	arguably	part	of	the	raison	d’être	of	metaphysics,	as	a	thriving	
intellectual	discipline,	that	everybody	seems	to	be	stuck	with	some	entities	in	their	
metaphysical	system	that	folk	ontology	does	not	recognize,	or	finds	it	hard	to	render	
ultimately	intelligible.	If	folk	ontology	provided	us	with	a	perfectly	intelligible	and	
unproblematic	picture	of	reality,	the	exercise	of	metaphysics	would	not	survive	2500	years	
of	ardent	application.	Kooky	objects	admittedly	claim	their	own	oddity.	But	a	one-category	
ontology	with	kooky	objects	aplenty	also	has	great	attraction:	in	its	beauty	and	simplicity,	it	
responsibly	stays	within	the	bounds	of	the	actual	world,	and	avoids	the	structural	mysteries	
of	states	of	affairs,	while	managing	to	provide	adequate	truthmakers	for	true	predicative	
statements.7	
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1	On	most	accounts	of	necessitation,	the	fact	that	Jimmy	is	either	round	or	not	round	necessitates	the	fact	that	
Jimmy	is	blue	–	but	obviously	it	does	not	explain	it.	And	according	to	“type-B	materialism,”	physical	truths	
necessitate	phenomenal	truths	without	closing	the	“explanatory	gap”	between	them;	this	too	would	involve	a	
non-explanatory	necessitation.		
	
2	The	extra	information	generates	a	statement	in	some	sense	richer	than	“SoL	exists,”	such	that	what	grounds	
the	truth	of	the	richer	statement	cannot	be	just	the	existence	of	SoL.	In	saying	that	a	statement	S1	is	“in	some	
sense	richer”	than	some	S2,	I	mean	that	S1	says	more	than	is	said	by	S2.		
	
3	There	is	a	complication	here	worth	flagging.	A	nominalist	could	also	treat	some	concrete	particulars	as	
ontologically	dependent	on,	grounded	in	or	reduced	to,	other	concrete	particulars.	Only	the	latter	would	this	
nominalist	treat	as	fundamental	–	these	might	be,	for	instance,	the	subatomic	particles.	In	that	case,	the	
individuation	of	the	non-fundamental	concrete	particulars	could	be	explained	in	terms	of	the	fundamental	
concrete	particulars.	It	would	then	be	brutal	individuation.	But	the	individuation	of	the	fundamental	concrete	
particulars	would	still	be	brutal.	I	will	ignore	this	complication	in	the	main	text.		
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4	There	may	admittedly	be	an	intuition	that	concrete	particulars,	in	their	considerable	substantiality,	weigh	
more	heavily	in	one’s	“ontological	credit	score”	than	the	flighty	entities	that	are	properties	and	states	of	
affairs.	But	what	is	this	intuition	really	saying?	It	seems	to	be	saying	that	concrete	particulars	are	somehow	
“more	real”	than	properties	and	states	of	affairs.	There	are	many	ways	to	approach	the	question	of	what	such	
a	claim	might	mean,	but	in	any	case	(plenitudinous)	nominalism	vindicates	the	idea	of	privileged	reality	in	
concrete	particulars.	
	
5	Also:	just	as	the	threat	of	vague	composition	of	ordinary	macroscopic	objects	motivates	positing	a	plenitude	
of	composites,	with	semantic	indecision	in	natural	language	as	to	which	among	them	is	picked	out	(see	Lewis	
1991),	so	the	prospects	of	vague	identity	and	persistence	conditions	may	motivate	a	plenitude	of	coincidents,	
with	similar	semantic	indecision	(see	Leslie	2011).	
	
6	Bradley	(1893)	argued	that	construing	the	metaphysical	glue	between	object	and	property	as	an	ordinary	
relation	would	just	raise	the	question	what	glues	together	the	object,	property,	and	relation.	The	answer	“a	
second-order	glue,”	if	unpacked	of	some	other	relation,	would	launch	us	on	a	regress.		
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